

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 36745

STATE OF IDAHO,)	2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 601
)	
Plaintiff-Respondent,)	Filed: August 20, 2010
)	
v.)	Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)	
JAMIE LYNN DIBBEN,)	THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
)	OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant.)	BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)	

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Juneal C. Kerrick, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified five-year sentence with two and a half-year determinate term for grand theft, affirmed; order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before LANSING, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;
and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Jamie Lynn Dibben pled guilty to grand theft. I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b)(9). The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence with a two and a half-year determinate term. Dibben violated the terms of her probation and the district court revoked probation, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and again placed Dibben on probation. Thereafter, Dibben admitted to violating the terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentence. Dibben filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of her sentence, which the district court denied. Dibben appeals,

contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, that the sentence is excessive, and that the district court erred in denying her Rule 35 motion.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See *State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. *State v. Hanington*, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. *Id.*

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. *State v. Knighton*, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); *State v. Allbee*, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of

new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. *State v. Huffman*, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In conducting our review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. *State v. Forde*, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987); *Lopez*, 106 Idaho at 449-51, 680 P.2d at 871-73.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, in ordering execution of Dibben's original sentence without modification, or in denying Dibben's Rule 35 motion. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Dibben's previously suspended sentence and the order denying her Rule 35 motion are affirmed.